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ABSTRACT
[1] The question of whether software programs embodying patented
processes need to be marked in accordance with the marking requirement
as set forth under 35 U.S.C. § 287 is an unanswered issue. This article
first analyzes the marking requirement in the United States patent system
and then goes on to survey the rocky history of patents on software
innovations. After noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal
Circuit has directly decided the issue of the applicability of the Marking
Statute to software programs, the article analyzes recent federal district
court and Federal Circuit cases, ultimately reasoning that the Federal
Circuit would likely conclude that software programs embodying patented
processes need to comply with the marking requirement of 35 U.S.C. §
287. Finally, the article concludes by discussing the ramifications of the
Marking Statute to software patents and the software industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
[2] Since 1842, within the United States, there has been a statutory
requirement that all patented articles be marked in such a way as to alert
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the public of such patent protection (the “Marking Requirement”). 1 As
the Federal Circuit has explained, the Marking Requirement serves to put
the public on notice that a product is patented in order to avoid innocent
infringement. 2 Under current patent law, the Marking Requirement is
prescribed by 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (the “Marking Statute”). Failure to mark
a “patented article” creates a bar to a patentee in collecting damages from
an infringer. 3
[3] The Marking Requirement is not imposed under two scenarios: (1)
where no patented article has been produced by a patentee or its licensee
(and thus there is no product to mark); and (2) where a patent is a pure
process or method patent (i.e., again, where there is no product to mark). 4
While these exceptions to the Marking Requirement are well established
in case law, the question of whether programs embodying software patents
need to meet the Marking Requirement remains unanswered. With respect
to the Marking Requirement, software patents 5 present an interesting grey
area, as many software patents are comprised of process claims 6 that are
not necessarily tangible. This article analyzes the Marking Requirement,
explores the history of patents on software-related innovations, and seeks
to address the question of whether software programs embodying patented
software processes need to be marked in accordance with the Marking
Requirement.
1

See Wine R. Appliance Co. v. Enter. R. Equip., 297 U.S. 387, 390 (1936) (describing
the Act of August 29, 1842, which required patentees to mark their patented articles and
penalized those who did not).
2
Nike, Inc. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that
the Marking Statute serves three purposes: (1) “helping to avoid innocent infringement”;
(2) “encouraging patentees to give notice to the public that the article is patented”; and
(3) “aiding the public to identify whether an article is patented”) (citations omitted).
3
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000).
4
Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 906 F. Supp. 813, 816 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(citing Bandag Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir.1983)).
5
Throughout this article, the phrase “software patent” will be used generically to refer to
any patented innovations that can be embodied in software. The United States Patent and
Trademark Office refer to software patents as “patents on computer-related inventions.”
See, e.g., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (the “MPEP”) § 2106
(Rev. 2, May 2004) (explaining that some patents that can be effectuated in software do
not necessarily mention software on the face of the patent application or issued patent).
6
Throughout this article, the phrase “process claims” will be used to mean both process
claims and method claims.
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II. THE MARKING STATUTE
[4] To date, neither the Federal Circuit nor any federal district court has
ruled whether the Marking Statute creates a bar to recovery of damages in
an instance where a software program, embodying one or more software
patents, is unmarked. 7
[5] The Marking Statute imposes limitations on the recovery of damages
in a successful patent infringement action. 8 In order for patentees to be in
a position to collect full statutorily recoverable damages, the requirements
of the Marking Statute must be met. 9 Failure to mark a patented article as
mandated in the statute can lead to a dramatic reduction of recoverable
damages by a patentee. The Federal Circuit has held that the Marking
Requirement is a statutory duty requiring a patent holder to give “in rem
notice to the world,” and that without such notice (i.e., without proper
marking) a plaintiff may not recover its full damages. 10
A. BASICS OF THE MARKETING STATUTE
[6] The basic requirement of the Marking Statute is that patentees must
“mark” their “patented article[s]” offered for sale within the United
States. 11 To comply with the Marking Requirement, it is necessary to give
notice of an article’s patented status either by including the “word ‘patent’
or the abbreviation ‘pat.’, together with the number of the patent” on the
article itself; or, where not feasible, such notice can be contained on the
article’s packaging. 12

7

E.g., Stephen Lindholm, Marking the Software Patent Beast 30 (Jan. 1, 2005)
(unpublished paper, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642123) (indicating that the Federal
Circuit has not decided whether software patents need be marked).
8
35 U.S.C. § 289 (2000) (stating that the patentee can seek, in addition to damages, an
infringer’s profits); Nike, 138 F.3d at 1446 (holding that in addition to limiting damages,
a failure to mark also limits recovery of such profits).
9

§ 289.
Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing
Hazeltine Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 20 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1937)).
11
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000).
12
Id.
10
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[7] The Marking Statute prevents recovery of damages unless the
infringer was on notice, either constructive or actual, that the infringed
article was protected by a valid United States patent. 13 If the infringed
patented article was marked in accordance with the Marking Statute, then,
the infringer is constructively deemed to be on notice of the article’s
patented status. 14 Consequently, compliance with the Marking Statute
acts, irrefutably, to “place the world on notice” that an article is protected
by a patent. 15 In the absence of appropriate marking, a patentee’s
recovery is limited to those damages that occurred after the patentee
actually places the infringer on notice of the alleged infringement. 16
B. THE FAILURE TO MARK
[8] The failure of a party to mark their product in accordance with the
Marking Statute results in an absolute inability to recover for infringement
damages by another party except for those damages that occurred after the
infringing party was placed on notice by the patentee of the
infringement. 17 A failure to comply with the Marking Statute places the
burden on the patentee to prove that the infringer was made aware of the
potential infringement by the patentee. 18 In the absence of marking, the
requirement of actual notice ensures two things: (1) that infringers are
13

Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting SRI Int’l, Inc. v.
Advanced Tech. Labs, Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
14
Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537 n.18.
15
Id. at 1538 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 806 F. Supp. 1294, 1296
(E.D. La. 1992)).
16
Amsted Indus. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(holding that, in the absence of marking, “notice must be of the infringement, not merely
notice of the patent's existence or ownership”) (internal quotations omitted); Am. Med.
Sys., 6 F.3d at 1536 (stating that liability for infringement of a product subject to the
Marking Requirement of § 287 occurs either from such time as the product was marked
as required by the statute or upon actual notice to the infringer of infringement by the
patentee). In many cases, such actual notice does not occur until a patent infringement
suit is filed.
17

Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1535.
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000) (“In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be
recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the
infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter. . .”); see
also Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537 n.18 (“The notice of the infringement therefore must
come from the patentee, not the infringer.” (quoting Devices for Medicine, Inc. v. Boehl,
822 F.2d 1062, 1066 (Fed. Cir.1987)).
18
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aware that their activity is infringing; and (2) that liability for such
infringement fails to accrue until such time as the patentee makes any
infringers aware of the infringement. 19
[9] The Federal Circuit has held that the duty to mark is proactive to the
patent holder and is irrespective of the knowledge of an alleged
infringer. 20 Consequently, whether an infringer knows that an article is
protected by a patent is immaterial; what is material is the moment in time
that the infringer was put on notice by the patentee that the infringer’s
product infringes. 21 Thus, it is not enough that an infringer knows that a
product is covered by a valid patent; rather, the patent holder must put the
alleged infringer on notice of the infringement, either by complying with
the Marking Requirement or by informing the infringer of the potential
infringement. 22 Additionally, the Federal Circuit has held that in order for
marking to satisfy the Marking Statute, “it must be substantially consistent
and continuous” such that a party who only occasionally and intermittently
complied with the Marking Requirement would be in no better shape than
would a patent holder who had not complied at all. 23
[10] The burden of proving compliance with the Marking Statute rests
with the patentee. 24 In the situation where a patentee has licensed the
right to produce the patented product to third parties, the obligation to
ensure compliance with the Marking Statute remains with the patentee. 25
However, in such a case, a patentee’s compliance will be judged on
whether the patentee took reasonable steps to ensure compliance and not
necessarily whether actual compliance was achieved. 26 Thus, in the case
where a third party fails to mark, the Marking Statute will not prove a bar
to recovery if a patentee demonstrates that reasonable steps were taken to
ensure compliance with the Marking Statute regardless of whether a third
party licensee fully complied with the statute.

19

SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Lab., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1344, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Amsted Indus., 24
F.3d at 187).
21
Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1537.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
20

25
26

Id.
Id. at 1111-12.
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C. LACK OF A TANGIBLE ARTICLE
[11] However, in cases where there is no product to mark, the Marking
Statute provides no bar to recovery of damages. 27 Thus, the Marking
Requirement is only necessary “in connection with some fabricated
article.” 28
[12] When the allegedly infringing product is made using a patented
process, it is well established that the Marking Requirement does not
affect the calculus of damages. 29 With respect to such patents, the Federal
Circuit has informed that “[t]he reason that the [M]arking [S]tatute does
not apply to [process] claims is that, ordinarily, where the patent claims
are directed to only a method or process[,] there is nothing to mark.” 30
However, where the patent consists of both apparatus and process claims,
the Marking Requirement is operable, at least to the extent that a tangible
product exists. 31
[13] As a result, there are at least two potential arguments to justify
excluding software covered by one or more patents from the Marking
Requirement: (1) that since software is not a tangible product, there is no
product required to be marked; and (2) that since the Federal Circuit has
indicated that products produced by pure process claims need not be
marked, software covered by process claims need not adhere to the
requirements of the Marking Statute. As discussed below, the analysis of
these arguments is not dispositive, and given the lack of judicial
pronouncements on this issue, it remains an unanswered question as to

27

Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing
Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 393 (1936)).
28
Id. (quoting Wine Ry. Appliance, 297 U.S. at 395).
29
State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v. Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1073 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (quoting Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., Inc., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
30
Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
31
State Contracting, 346 F.3d 1057 at 1074 (quoting Am. Med. Sys., 6 F.3d at 1538).
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whether a software program that embodies one or more software patents
needs to adhere to the requirements of the Marking Statute.

III. SOFTWARE PATENTS
A. EARLY HISTORY OF SOFTWARE PATENTS
[14] The history of software patents in the United States is a rocky,
convoluted one. It has only been in the last approximately twenty-five
years that software innovation has enjoyed patent protection and only
since 1996 has the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
actually had guidelines for dealing with software patents. 32 As recently as
1966, a report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System
proposed that computer programs be denied patent protection. 33
[15] Generally speaking, in order for something to be eligible for patent
protection, it must be useful (as required under 35 U.S.C. § 101); it must
be novel (as detailed under 35 U.S.C. § 102); it must be “nonobvious” (as
detailed under 35 U.S.C. § 103); and it must fit both a written description
and enabling requirement (as detailed under 35 U.S.C. § 112). 34
However, most of the debate and controversy surrounding software
patents in the United States has centered not on the question of whether a
particular software innovation meets the statutory requirements of
patentability, but rather on the threshold question of whether software
innovations are the kind of which are protectable at all under federal
patent law. 35 Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, only a “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” can receive a patent. It was under
a holding that software innovations are not patentable subject matter (i.e.,
that software innovations are neither a process, machine, manufacture, nor

32

See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb.
28, 1996).
33
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 197 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34
35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
35
See, e.g., Thomas P. Burke, Software Patent Protection: Debugging the Current
System, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115, 1142 (1994) (citing 35 U.S.C. §101 foundation
patent requirements but questioning how, with thousands of software patents already
issued, “the question [of] whether software per se can be patented is still hotly debated.”).
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composition of matter) that the Supreme Court initially declared software
innovations unpatentable.

B. A PREMATURE END TO SOFTWARE PATENTS
[16] In 1972, the Supreme Court set down precedent effectively denying a
mathematical algorithm protection under patent law. 36 In Gottschalk v.
Benson, the Court ruled that a patent application for an algorithm was
properly denied by the PTO as not protectable subject matter. 37
[17] As stated above, under U.S. patent law, any “process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter” is appropriate subject matter for
patent protection. 38 In Benson, the Court ruled that the software
innovation in question was not protectable under patent law owing to a
lack of patentable subject matter. 39 In declining to characterize an
algorithm as protectable subject matter, the Court relied on two
fundamental precepts: (1) that an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a
natural phenomenon is not patentable subject matter and (2) that a patent
must have a definitive scope. 40
[18] Courts have long held that patents on abstract ideas, laws of nature,
and natural phenomena are not patentable subject matter. 41 In essence, the
courts have made a distinction between mere discovery of that which

36

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Id. at 71-72. The algorithm in question dealt with converting binary-coded decimal
(“BCD”) notation into pure binary notation. In BCD notion, each digit of a number is
converted to its constituent notion in binary. Thus the number 152 in BCD notion is
represented as 0001 (for 1), 0101 (for 5), and 0010 (for 2). In pure binary notion, the
number 152 is represented as 010011000. The ramifications of this algorithm amounted
to a substantial increase in the speed at which computerized switches could route
telephone calls. For a more detailed explanation, see Benson, 409 U.S. at 65-67.
38
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
39
Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
40
Id. at 67-68.
41
See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131-132 (1948) (holding that
a discovery relating to the qualities of certain strains of naturally occurring bacteria is not
patentable); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) (“An idea of
itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is.”).
37
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already exists in nature and true invention. 42 Consequently, Einstein
would not have been able to patent his famous discovery that E=MC2, 43
but Edison was able to patent his invention of the carbon filament light
bulb. 44
[19] Courts have also held that claims lacking definitive scope are
unpatentable. 45 According to the Court in Benson, a patent on the
algorithm for converting BCD notation to pure binary notation could not
be allowed as it would effectively grant the patentee the rights to all uses
of such conversions, even if such uses have not yet been invented. 46
[20] In Benson, the Court went out of its way to explicitly state that it did
not hold software, in and of itself, to be non-patentable subject matter; 47
nevertheless, its ruling was largely viewed as deterring patents on
software. 48
C. SOFTWARE PATENT REVIVAL
[21] Benson’s chilling effect on software patents was ended in the early
1980’s largely due to the influence of two Supreme Court cases. In
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court overruled a PTO ruling and
found that man-made micro-organisms were patentable such matter.49 In
so concluding, the Court found that it was Congress’s intent in passing the
1952 Patent Act, to provide patent protection for “anything under the sun

42

E.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
44
U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Jan 27, 1880).
45
See, e.g., O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 113 (1854) (holding that a particular claim in
Samuel Morse’s patent on the telegraph was void as it amounted to a claim on any
method that used electric signals as a means of communication, even those which had not
yet been invented).
43

46

Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
Id..
48
Burke, supra note 35, at 1144 (“Justice Douglas’ opinion in Gottschalk v. Benson
virtually foreclosed the patentability of computer programs.”).
49
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310; see also Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual
Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, n.44 (2004) (stating that this
case is widely heralded as jump-starting the biotechnology industry within the United
States).
47

9

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XII, Issue1

that is made by man.” 50 While noting that “laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” fall outside of this broad ambit, the Court
made clear that what constitutes patentable subject matter is to be defined
broadly. 51
[22] The following year, the Court decided Diehr. 52 In this case, the
Court was required to determine whether a new method for curing
synthetic rubber was patentable. 53 Part of the claimed invention involved
the use of a computer to repeatedly apply a well-known equation in order
to dynamically calculate the proper heating time to cure a quantity of
synthetic rubber. 54 Sensors inside the molds would periodically report the
temperature of the rubber, thus providing the necessary inputs for the
equation. 55 The PTO rejected the patent on the grounds that, as a
computer program, the invention was not directed towards an invention of
patentable subject matter. 56 However, the Supreme Court overruled the
PTO, and declared the invention patentable and held that software, at least
under certain circumstances, was a patentable subject matter. 57
[23] It is notable that the Supreme Court was consistent in its
pronouncements regarding the patentability of software innovations
(namely that an algorithm is patentable subject matter so long as the
algorithm only uses mathematical relationships to achieve its ends as
opposed to trying to patent the mathematical relationships themselves).
Yet, the result of these two cases on the allowability of software patents
was profound. Much as the Gottschalk decision had a chilling effecting
on software patents, with Diehr, software patents began to enjoy a
renaissance. Today, there are over 100,000 issued software patents. 58
D. DEFINING ALGORITHM
50

Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979 at 5 (1952), as reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
51
Id.
52
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
53
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 177-78.
54
Id. at 178-79.
55
Id.
56

Id. at 180.
Id. at 193.
58
Lindholm, supra note 7, at 3.
57
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[24] The difference between Benson and Diehr is the Court’s
understanding of the definition of an algorithm. In Benson, the Court,
taking a narrow definition, recited the following explanation of an
algorithm:
A procedure for solving a given type of
mathematical problem is known as an
“algorithm.” The procedures set forth in the
present claim are of that kind; that is to say,
they are a generalized formulation for
programs to solve mathematical problems of
converting one form of numerical
representation to another. From the generic
formulation, programs may be developed as
specific applications. 59
Thus, under the Benson definition, an algorithm will not be patentable
subject matter if it amounts to nothing more than an attempt to claim
“math” as mathematics falls outside the scope of patentable subject
matter. 60
[25] The Diehr Court, however, allowed a software patent to issue. The
Court distinguished itself from its prior decisions by making clear that
where a mathematical formula is used as part of a process, even where the
formula is well-known and, so long as the process itself is otherwise
patentable, a patent may issue. 61 The Court defined a process as:
‘[A] mode of treatment of certain materials
to produce a given result. It is an act, or a
series of acts, performed upon the subjectmatter to be transformed and reduced to a
59

Benson, 409 U.S. at 65.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 186 (explaining that the decision in Benson interprets an algorithm,
like a mathematical formula, to be equivalent to a law of nature and therefore not of
patentable subject matter).
61
Id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
60
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different state or thing. If new and useful, it
is just as patentable as is a piece of
machinery. In the language of patent law, it
is an art. The machinery pointed out as
suitable to perform the process may or may
not be new or patentable; whilst the process
itself may be altogether new, and produce an
entirely new result. The process requires
that certain things should be done with
certain substances, and in a certain order;
but the tools to be used in doing this may be
of secondary consequence. 62
[26] Thus, in Diehr, the Court abandoned the notion that an algorithm is
nothing but a representation of underlying unpatentable mathematics, and
adopted a more expansive concept which allowed for the patenting of
algorithms that produced a tangible result.
E. FREEMAN-WALTER-ABELE TEST
[27] Concurrent with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in
Chakrabarty and Diehr, the lower courts developed a test to determine
whether an algorithm was patentable or whether it was merely a
nonpatentable mathematical process. This test, generally referred to as the
Freeman-Walter-Abele test, 63 has two parts. First, an examining entity
(such as the PTO or a court) should determine whether a mathematical
algorithm is recited directly or indirectly by a claim. 64 If recited directly,
the second portion of the test is to determine whether the claim is directed
to the algorithm (in which case it is not patentable subject matter) or if
rather the claim merely uses the algorithm as part of its claimed process. 65

62

Id. at 182-83 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88 (1876)).
The etymology of this semi-eponymous test can be traced over the course of three
cases: In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980); and In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
64
Arrythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
65
Id.
63
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As the court explained in Arrythmia Research, “the emphasis is ‘on what
the claimed method steps do rather than how the steps are performed.’” 66
[28] However, it is clear that this test is no longer applicable to the
patentability of software patents. In the original guidelines promulgated
by the PTO regarding the examination of computer-related inventions,
patent examiners were informed that “[t]he Freeman-Walter-Abele test
may additionally be relied upon in analyzing claims directed solely to a
process for solving a mathematical algorithm.” 67 Subsequent rulings by
the Federal Circuit have informed that the rulings of Diehr and
Chakrabarty have obviated the test with respect to its ability to determine
patentability. 68 Current PTO examiners are now informed that they
should “no longer rely on the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to determine
whether a claimed invention is directed to statutory subject matter.” 69
Instead, examiners are directed to ensure that the “claimed invention as a
whole must accomplish a practical application.” 70
IV. MUST SOFTWARE BE MARKED?
A. CURRENT STATUS OF SOFTWARE PATENTS
[29] As indicated above, the notion of receiving a software patent has not
always been a firmly established tenet of the United States patent system.
In fact, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Diehr, most patents on
software innovations were disguised in patent applications as being
hardware innovations. 71
[30] The predominate early debate over patenting software innovations
turned on the question of whether software was of patentable subject
matter. 72 Early cases, in part based on the rudimentary functionality of
66

Id. (quoting Ex Parte Logan, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1465, 1468 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Interf.
1991)) (emphases in original).
67
Examination Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7479 (Feb. 28, 1996).
68
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
69
MPEP § 2106.
70
Id.
71
Simson L. Garfinkel, Patently Absurd, 2.07 WIRED MAGAZINE., July 1994, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.07/patents_pr.html.
72
See supra PART III.
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software, held that software did not do anything other than perform
mathematics, albeit very quickly and efficiently. 73 Thus, owing to a
proscription on the patenting of mathematical formulas, software was not
deemed patentable subject matter. 74
[31] As the judicial interpretation of this issue began to evolve over the
next decade, slowly, the notion that software was merely unpatentable
mathematics and laws of nature changed. 75 In Diehr, the Court allowed a
patent on an invention, whose only innovative step was the use of a
particular software process. 76 In so doing, the Diehr court re-invigorated
the notion that innovations in the field of computer software were
patentable subject matter. 77
[32] Over the course of the intervening years, the courts and the PTO
increasingly warmed to the notion of patents on software innovations, and
in 1996, the PTO promulgated guidelines for dealing with patents on such
inventions (“PTO Guidelines”). 78 Under the PTO Guidelines any claimed
invention, computer-related or otherwise, must meet the requirements of
35 U.S.C. § 101, including the requirements of utility, 79 and the
requirements of novelty 80 and obviousness 81 as well as meeting certain
enabling and written description requirements. 82 Whereas, for most
claimed inventions, the utility requirement poses a low barrier to
patentability, 83 the PTO Guidelines require an examiner to pay special
73

See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
Id.
75
See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text.
76
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
77
See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
78
See Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (Feb.
28, 1996), now embodied in § 2106 of the MPEP.
79
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
80
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
81
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
82
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
83
Patent law’s requirement of utility has always been a relatively low bar to overcome.
While the boundaries of this concept are hard to define, the patent office generally treats
utility in a nominal fashion. In general, utility must be something more substantive than,
for example, “use of a complex invention as landfill.” See MPEP § 2107(II)(B)(1)(i).
Most inventions will have some usefulness, and will find that the utility requirement
poses little barrier to patentability.
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attention to this requirement in the case of a computer-related invention. 84
While the confines of the utility requirement for computer-related
inventions have yet to be fully defined by the courts, the PTO Guidelines
make clear that utility of a computer-related invention must be something
more than just data or information stored on a computer-readable medium.
For example, a DVD movie is not patentable simply because it can be
accessed by a computer and is therefore not patentable as “nonfunctional
descriptive information.” Other forms of “nonfunctional descriptive
material” include music stored on a compact disc, books stored in a digital
form, and any “compilation or mere arrangement of data.” 85
[33] The PTO instructs its examiners to “determine what the programmed
computer does when it performs the process dictated by the software.” 86
The MPEP notes, quoting Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v.
Corazonix Corp., 87 that in making this determination, the examiner needs
to look beyond the base distinction of how the computer performs its
programmed function (i.e., manipulating binary data through mathematical
operations) to what the computer is doing. 88 Thus, the pre-Diehr
conception that software merely performs mathematical algorithms and is,
therefore, not patentable, has been expunged. Examiners are required to
look not at how the computer interprets the algorithm but at the results of
the process.
[34] Bound to this determination is the question of whether the invention
is of patentable subject matter. While mindful of the Supreme Court’s
determination in Chakrabarty that patentable subject matter should be
treated with a fairly expansive scope, examiners are reminded that there
are limits to what can be patented, and only that which is a machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or a process is patentable. 89
[35] Software fits this statutory definition in one of two ways: either (1)
as a pure process patent; or (2) as a mixed process and apparatus patent.
84

MPEP § 2106(II)(A).
MPEP § 2106(IV)(B)(1).
86
MPEP § 2106 (II)(B).
87
Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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MPEP § 2106 (II)(B).
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MPEP § 2106(IV)(A) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).
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In the latter case, the PTO will treat a general-function computer that is
programmed with the software on which a patent is sought as the
apparatus. 90 Thus, where the patent contains both process and apparatus
claims, the invention is a general-function computer (i.e., the apparatus)
that is running certain software (i.e., processes that are contained in the
software). A computer program can be claimed as a pure process patent
only in the instance where the “computer is executing the computer
program’s instructions.” 91
B. IS SOFTWARE A PATENTED ARTICLE
[36] The judiciary has not specified whether a program that embodies one
or more software patents needs to be marked in accordance with the
Marking Statute. 92 The answer to this question depends on whether the
judiciary will interpret software to be a “patented invention” under the
Marking Statute. 93
[37] To date, the Federal Circuit has not addressed the meaning of the
term “patented article” under the Marking Statute. 94 However, as
discussed below, several Federal Circuit (and federal district) court
pronouncements relating to software patents indicate that were courts to
consider whether programs that embody software patents need to be
marked in accordance with the Marking Statute, they would likely hold in
the affirmative.
C. NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE INNOVATIONS
[38] In a recent case, Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal
Circuit, upholding in part the lower court’s finding of infringement,
determined affirmatively that software should be considered a “component

90

A variant of this mixed apparatus and process exists where the computer program is
claimed in conjunction with a physical structure such as a disk. See AT&T Corp. v.
Excel Commc’n, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
91
MPEP § 2106(IV)(B)(1)(a).
92
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000).
93
35 U.S.C. § 287(a).
94
§ 287(a).
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of a patented invention” as required under 35 U.S.C. § 271. 95 In this case,
the court had to grapple with the issue of whether copies of Microsoft’s
Internet Explorer software that were physically created abroad, but used a
master CD-ROM with the source code created in the United States, could
be used in the calculus of infringement damages. Ultimately, the court
found that source code and master CD-ROM software constituted a
component of a patented invention and could be used in calculating
damages. 96 In so ruling, the Federal Circuit concurred with the lower
court on this issue, explaining that with respect to software innovations
there is no practical difference between a software-based invention and a
hardware-based invention. 97 Although the specific legal question
addressed by the court in Eolas is removed from the issue presented in this
article, it is clear the Federal Circuit is comfortable treating software
programs as apparatus-like under the patent laws. Since there is little
doubt that computer hardware is a patented article under the Marking
Statute, it stands to reason that under the Eolas decision, courts should
treat software in the same manner. 98
[39] Similarly, the Federal Circuit, in Minton v. National Ass’n of
Securities Dealers, 99 held that the leasing of a program to a third party
more than one year prior to the filing of an application on processes
embodied within the program was contrary to the On-Sale Bar of the
Patent Code. 100 Here the court noted that there is a difference for the
purposes of applying the On-Sale Bar to a tangible product and to a
process, 101 but nevertheless agreed with the lower court that the leasing of
the computer program constituted a violation of the On-Sale Bar (thus
holding the difference between a tangible product and a computer process
inapposite in that context). 102 By analogy to the Marking Requirement, it
95

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2002); Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399
F.3d 1325, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
96
Id. at 1338-1341.
97
Id. at 1339 (“Hardware and software . . . are practically interchangeable in the field of
computer technology.” (quoting Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d
972, 974 (N.D. Ill. 2003))).
98
See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 806 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. La. 1992).
99
Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Sec. Dealers, 336 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
100
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
101
Minton, 336 F.3d at 1378 (informing that there is a difference between the sale of a
“tangible item” and “an invention that describes a series of steps in an invention”).
102
Id.

17

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XII, Issue1

seems that just as the Federal Circuit is willing to liken the lease of a
program to being more akin to the sale of a tangible item than to the sale
of a process; it would be willing to liken a program to a “patented article”
under the Marking Statute.
D. ANALOGY TO THE FALSE MARKETING STATUTE
[40] In Clontech Lab., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., the Federal Circuit dealt
with issues pertaining to 35 U.S.C. § 292 (the “False Marking Statute”). 103
The False Marking Statute imposes penalties on those who falsely indicate
that their product is covered by a patent or who produce and mark a
product as patented without the permission of the patentee. 104 In
Clontech, the court explained that “Congress intended the public to rely on
marking as a ‘ready means of discerning the status of intellectual property
embodied in an article of manufacture or design.’” 105 The purpose of the
False Marking Statute is to punish those (i) who try to dupe the public
either into believing that their product is covered by a patent when it is
not; or (ii) who try to make the public believe that their “patented” product
is somehow sanctioned by the patentee.106 In this sense, the underlying
rationale of the False Marking Statute as to the first of the indicated
purposes is not that different from that of the Marking Statute whose
purpose has been said to be “aiding the public to identify whether an
article is patented.” 107
[41] Moreover, the court in Clontech implied that an unpatented product
embodying or made using a patented process can be falsely marked where
such a product is marked as being patented and produced without the
permission of the patentee. 108 By the same token, in the case of an article
made with or embodying a patented process, it ought to be marked in
103

Clontech Labs., Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
35 U.S.C. § 292 (2000) (creating a fine for up to $500 for each offense).
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Clontech, 406 F.3d at 1356 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,
489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)).
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accordance with the Marking Statute. 109 It stands to reason that if there
can be liability under the False Marking Statute for falsely marking an
unprotected product that embodies process claims, liability must equally
exist for a failure to properly mark the same product. 110 In other words, if
one can be punished for falsely marking a tangible unpatented process
under the False Marking Statute, 111 then liability ought to equally attach
for not marking the same process pursuant to the Marking Statute 112 if the
process is actually covered by a patent.
E. FEDERAL DISTRICT TEST FOR A “PATENTED ARTICLE”
[42] Several district court decisions have suggested a simple, axiomatictest for determining whether a “patented article” needs to conform to the
requirements of the Marking Statute. The test posits that a court should
determine whether the product is such that if made by someone else other
than the patentee or its licensee, it would create liability for
infringement. 113 Under such a test, software programs that embody one or
more software patents will meet the definition of patented article and will
thus require marking in accordance with the statute. 114 This is true either
where the software innovation is claimed as a series of process claims or
the innovation is claimed as a mixture of process and apparatus claims.
[43] Even if this test proves inappropriate, it is clear that any software
products that embody software patents that contain a mixture of both
process and apparatus claims will be considered patented articles under the
Marking Statute. And if the test does prove inappropriate, it still remains

109

35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2000).
§ 292.
111
Id.
112
§ 287(a).
113
Broadcom Corp. v. Agere Sys., Inc., No. 04-CIV-2416, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18163,
at *9-11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2004) (refusing to dismiss on summary judgment a claim for
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a question as to whether software products that embody only process
claims could be considered “patented articles.”

F. PURE PROCESS EXCEPTION MIGHT APPLY TO SOFTWARE PROGRAMS
[44] The strongest argument that software programs are exempt from the
Marking Requirement is the notion that software patents are more akin to
process claims and that, under “settled” Federal Circuit holdings, such
process claims are exempt from the requirement of the Marking Statute.
[45] In Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., Inc., 115 the Federal Circuit
noted that “the notice requirement of [the Marking Statute] does not apply
where the patent is directed to a process or method.” 116 In so holding, the
court relied upon Wine Railway Appliance Co. v. Enterprise Railway
Equipment Co., a much earlier Supreme Court pronouncement. 117
[46] However, the question presented in Wine Railway dealt with a
different issue. In Wine Railway, Enterprise Railway Equipment
Company (“Enterprise”) sued Wine Railway Appliance Co. (“Wine”) for
patent infringement. 118 The district court found that Wine had infringed a
patent that had been assigned to Enterprise and was required to pay
$18,002.83. 119 The appellate court partially overturned the lower court
and reduced the amount of the award to $12,512.06 representing the
amount of damages that occurred after notice of infringement had been
given. 120 Under the appellate court’s analysis, Enterprise was only
entitled to the damages that occurred after Wine had been placed on notice
of the infringement of the patent at issue in the dispute. 121
[47] In this case, Enterprise never produced any product that had been
covered by the patent at issue. Under the appellate court’s analysis this
constituted a failure to mark, limiting damages to those that occurred after
115
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the infringer had been placed on notice of the infringement by the
patentee. 122 The Supreme Court ruled that where a party holds a patent,
but has never produced a product covered by the patent, the Marking
Statute does not apply. 123 Dicta within the opinion noted, as part of the
Court’s overview of the cases applying the Marking Statute (as it existed
at that time), that certain lower courts have held that the Marking
Requirement “does not apply to a process patent, since the process is not
susceptible of marking.” 124
[48] Bandag involved the use by Gerrard Tire Co., Inc. (“Gerrard”), of a
system for retreading used tires that was covered by a patent owned by
Bandag, Inc. (“Bandag”). 125 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the court
affirmed the holding of the lower district court with respect to Gerrard’s
arguments relating to the Marking Requirement. Gerrard argued it should
not be held liable for damages relating its infringement prior to the point at
which it was placed on notice by Bandag that it was infringing. 126
Additionally, Gerrard argued the Marking Statute applied to the patented
Bandag process; therefore, Bandag’s failure to mark products produced
under the process (a process which it used and licensed to franchisees),
barred Bandag from recovery of full infringement damages. 127 The
Federal Circuit, concurring with the opinion of the lower court and relying
on Wine Railway, stated it was “settled in the case law that the notice
requirement of [the Marking Statute] does not apply where the patent is
directed at a process or method.” 128
[49] The same year that the Federal Circuit decided Bandag, it also
decided Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area. 129 Here, the Federal Circuit
122
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made the strongest statement that a machine merely utilizing a patented
process is not a “patented article” under the Marking Statute. In Hanson,
the issue was over snow machines used by Alpine Valley Ski Area
(“Alpine Valley”) that infringed Hanson’s patented method of snowmaking. 130 Hanson had developed the method and had licensed it to a
third-party, Snow Machines Incorporated (“SMI”), who produced
machines that utilized Hanson’s method in order to make snow. Hedco,
Inc. (“Hedco”) sold machines to Alpine Valley utilizing the same
method; 131 however, Hedco did so without a proper license. 132
[50] On appeal from a lower court verdict ordering Alpine Valley to pay
damages to Hanson for infringement, Alpine Valley argued that, pursuant
to the Marking Statute, damages should be limited to those which occurred
after Alpine Valley had been placed on notice of the infringement as the
machines produced by SMI were not properly marked. 133 Noting that
certain process claims of the Hanson patent had been found to be infringed
by Alpine Valley’s use of the Hedco snow-making machines, the Federal
Circuit concluded, keeping with the court’s recent pronouncement in
Bandag, that any restriction on infringement damages imposed by the
Marking Statute does not apply where the claims at issue are process
claims. 134 Thus, the court’s holding was highly supportive of the notion
that the Marking Statute does not apply to machines that embody process
claims, as opposed to being separately patented themselves as apparatus
claims. By analogy to the snow-machines in Hanson, it is arguable that
software programs embodying patented processes, even where the same
patent also contains claims directed to an apparatus that uses the
processes, are not restricted by the Marking Statute.
[51] However, in American Medical Systems, the Federal Circuit pulled
back from this simplistic standard that under no circumstances does the
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Marking Statute apply to claims directed at processes. 135 Instead, the
Federal Circuit held that:
The purpose behind the [M]arking [S]tatute
is to encourage the patentee to give notice to
the public of the patent. The reason that the
[M]arking [S]tatute does not apply to
method claims is that, ordinarily, where the
patent claims are directed to only a method
or process there is nothing to mark. Where
the patent contains both apparatus and
method claims, however, to the extent that
there is a tangible item to mark by which
notice of the asserted method claims can be
given, a party is obliged to do so if it intends
to avail itself of the constructive notice
provisions of section 287(a). 136
[52] Here, the court defines a different test for a patented article and,
consequently, whether the Marking Statute applies. The test is not whether
the claims deal with process claims, as indicated by the Bandag opinion,
but rather, whether there exists a tangible article to mark. 137
G. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
[53] Until such time as the Federal Circuit rules more specifically on this
issue, it is unclear whether programs sold embodying software patents
need to be marked in accordance with the Marking Statute. What is clear,
however, is that the policy arguments in favor of adopting an approach
that includes defining patented software as a “patented article” under the
Marking Statute are strong.
[54] The policies underlying the Marking Statute are best served by
requiring patentees to mark software programs that embody patented
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processes. 138 A contrary view would permit patentees to circumvent the
marking provisions by claiming only the use of processes, which is
detrimental to the public interests that underlie the Marking Statute. 139
This concern is particularly relevant in the case of computer software
because:
[S]oftware can also be patented as a method.
Under the present law, which exempts pure
method patents [namely, patents that contain
only method claims] from the marking
requirements of section 287(a) entirely, the
patent owner who sells software protected
by a pure method patent would be under no
obligation to mark the disk as patented. If
the disk is not labeled as patented, persons
who obtain copies of the disk may
erroneously believe that the “invention” it
contains is free for all the world to make,
use, and sell. It only makes sense to require
that the disk or magnetic tape on which the
software resides be marked so as to put the
world on notice that unauthorized copying
and use of the software constitutes not only
copyright infringement but patent
infringement as well. This is equally true
whether the software is protected by
apparatus claims, method claims, or both.
There is no reason that the marking
requirement should not also extend to software
patented under pure method claims. 140
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V. CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING MARKING REQUIREMENT
TO SOFTWARE PATENTS
[55] For many companies, the implicit purpose of acquiring software
patents is not for use as a weapon against those who may infringe, but
rather as defensive ammunition to use against those who would accuse
them of infringement. For these companies, the benefit in a portfolio of
software patents is to have strong currency with which to barter when
others assert software patents against them. For example, if a software
company comes after Company A for patent infringement, Company A
can use its large software patent portfolio to countersue, in the event that
the suing company infringes one of Company A’s patents, or it can offer
the suing company the right to license from its patent portfolio in
exchange for a cross-license.
[56] However, even for defensive uses of software patents, the question of
whether the Marking Statute applies is not academic. Assuming,
arguendo, that the Marking Requirement applies to software programs, if
the patent holder has not adhered to the Marking Requirement, such a
holder is limited to seeking injunctive relief forcing it to stop the
continued sale of any infringing projects. Nevertheless, a company that
adheres to the requirement now has an arguably more effective deterrent:
the ability to countersue for monetary damages. A company would think
twice about bringing an infringement lawsuit if there was a possibility that
the company could be countersued for monetary damages, as opposed to
mere injunctive relief.
[57] In the world of software, unlike, for example, biotechnology, it is
often the case that there is an alternative non-patented method to achieve a
similar result. In the case where a company is enjoined from further
infringing another’s software patent, it is not uncommon that the company
will nevertheless be able to work around the patent. An award of
monetary damages, on the other hand, could be crippling to a company,
especially in light of the fact that an infringer would potentially be liable
for every copy of an infringing product sold. Consequently, even for
companies that wish to use their patents defensively, adherence to the
Marking Requirement, where feasible, would likely strengthen their
defensive position by providing the ability to countersue for monetary
25
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damages, thus increasing the deterrent effect of their respective patent
portfolios.
VI. CONCLUSION
[58] There is substantial Federal Circuit precedent for the notion that
programs that embody software patents must be considered a “patented
article” under the Marking Statute. The Eolas decision suggests that the
Federal Circuit sees little difference between hardware-based inventions
and software-based inventions. 141 Similarly, the Minton decision indicates
a willingness on the part of the Federal Circuit to liken programs to
tangible goods. 142 Taken separately or together, these opinions suggest
that the Federal Circuit would likely consider a program embodying a
software patent to be a “patented article” under the Marking Statute under
one of two theories: either because software should be treated similarly to
hardware, which is clearly a patented article, or because, on balance,
patented software has enough characteristics to qualify it as a product and,
thus, a patented article.
[59] Even if the Federal Circuit is not swayed by these or similar
arguments, at least two different federal district courts have suggested a
test for the determination of whether something is a “patented article.” 143
This test, namely that an article is a patented article if, when made by
another a party, the patent is infringed, if adopted by the Federal Circuit
would firmly place programs into the category of being a patented article
for the purpose of the Marking Statute. 144
[60] Finally, it is not clear that the early Federal Circuit Bandag-type
pronouncements that infringement of pure process claims are outside the
scope of the Marking Statute apply to software programs. The appropriate
standards seem to focus more on the existence of an object to mark, and,
where there is no tangible product to mark, the Marking Requirement
poses no bar to recovery. With regard to software programs, given that
there is something that can be marked, the likely conclusion should be that
the Marking Requirement applies.
141
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[61] With the large proliferation in software patents in recent years, the
potential for innocent infringement is growing exponentially. It is
protection against innocent infringement which is exactly what the
Marking Requirement is supposed to cure. Not only should the Marking
Statute apply to software programs, but existing precedent and logic
dictate that such is the case. Regardless, given the high stakes involved
and the strong arguments in favor of applying the Marking Requirement to
programs that embody software patents, until the Federal Circuit provides
absolute clarity on this issue, companies that produce programs which
they believe are covered by software patents should mark their products in
conformity with the Marking Statute.
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